Infectious music: music-listener emotional contagion I have long been interested in the expression of emotion in music and in the response this calls forth from the listener. One such response is a mirroring or echoing one; sad music tends to make (some) listeners feel sad and happy music to make them happy.
Infectious music: music-listener emotional contagion I have long been interested in the expression of emotion in music and in the response this calls forth from the listener. One such response is a mirroring or echoing one; sad music tends to make (some) listeners feel sad and happy music to make them happy.
This mirroring reaction is brought about by what I have called emotional contagion. We tend to resonate with the emotional tenor of the music, much as we catch the emotional ambience emanating from other people.
Reflecting on the musical case not only enhances understanding of the listener's response, it provides a novel objection to the cognitive theory of the emotions favored by many philosophers and invites critical consideration of the models for human-to-human emotional contagion proposed by psychologists.
As I try to show, the most common accounts of emotional contagion should be developed and refined in light of analysis of emotional contagion in the musical case, which recommends, for example, that we distinguish attention from non-attentional modes of emotional transmission and, in general, avoid defining the phenomenon reductively in terms of the routes and mechanisms of communication.
****** In the 1960s and 70s, philosophers (Kenny 1963 , Solomon 1976 , Lyons 1980 ) developed what became known as the cognitive account of the emotions. Emotions are object-directed states characterized in terms of the beliefs under which their intentional objects are subsumed. For example, if I am afraid for myself I am afraid of or about something-a rise in the mortgage rate, say-and I believe that a rise in the mortgage rate will injure me or otherwise affect me adversely. A rise in the interest rate is the intentional object (or emotional object) of my fear, and the belief that the intentional object of my response will injure me or otherwise affect me adversely, a description sometimes known as the formal object of fear, is what characterizes the response as fearful. Similarly, for my emotion to be one of envy I must believe that another possesses something that I desire and do not have, and so on.
Though proponents of the theory occasionally suggest that the nature of the belief is sufficient to determine what emotion is involved, the more circumspect view is that the relevant belief is necessary and that no other condition is also sufficient. In other words, other conditions might be necessary for an emotion's being one of fear, but among the conditions that are jointly sufficient for an emotion's being fear is the condition that the relevant beliefs, ones about dangers posed by the emotion's object, are present.
1 It is the centrality that this theory accords to the role of belief that led to its being called a cognitive account of the emotions.
A number of fairly obvious putative counterexamples can be ranged against the cognitive theory of the emotions. Phobias either involve beliefs not appropriate to the emotion's object or are impervious to beliefs that should block the response. Reflexive affective responses of the kind sometimes called quick and dirty or fast and frugal by psychologists also seem to operate independently of, and be unaffected by, the responder's belief systems. As Darwin (1889 [1998 ) famously observed, he flinched in fear of a striking snake even as he knew it was separated from him by an unbreakable glass barrier. Meanwhile, emotional reactions to fictions Stephen Davies 3 recognized as such, as when I feel sad at Mimi's death in La Bohème, or to counterfactually entertained scenarios, as when I feel sad as a result of imagining a world without birds, also do not involve beliefs that should be crucial: that Mimi exists or existed and therefore suffered the fate depicted or that the earth will be bereft of birds. As well as these cases, all of which question the claimed tie between the emotion's kind and the content of the beliefs of the person who experiences it, there are others denying that emotions necessarily take emotional objects. Apparently there are objectless moods and feelings, as when one is gloomy but not about anything in particular or where one experiences an undirected sense of dread or foreboding.
There are a number of replies the cognitivist can offer.
Emotional reactions that are based on irrational or otherwise mistaken beliefs are inappropriate to the way the real world is but are not otherwise unintelligible. And reactions that do not engage the responder's beliefs perhaps should not be put together with fullblooded emotions. In this view, reflexive reactions either are not emotions at all or they form a minor, peripheral class within the wider group in which cognitively founded, object-directed emotions are central and paradigmatic. 2 As for moods and anxieties that appear to be objectless, it could be argued that they take relatively general objects rather than specific ones (Goldie 2000:143) -one is depressed about the condition of the world at large, though not at a
Stephen Davies 4 2
If emotions serve adaptive functions, as is widely claimed (Plutchik 1980 , Lazarus 1991 , Le Doux 1996 , and if we share many emotions with less cognitively sophisticated species, as seems hard to deny, the cognitive theory does look to be parochial and narrow. On the other hand, Griffiths' conclusion (1997) , that "conceptual analysis" provides no coherent account of cognitively sophisticated emotions and that they are beyond the pale because psychologists' methodologies cannot deal with them, seems equally biased. particular part of it (Solomon 1976:172-3 )-or that their objects are unconscious (Lyons 1980 profile. An implausible alternative is Coleridge's suggestion that one suspends-or in contemporary jargon, puts off-line-one's awareness of the fictionality of the events shown or described.
There is the proposal that the response is non-rational, either because beliefs in the existence of their objects are absent or, for other reasons, because one does not believe one's responses can affect or engage with the object of the response. Colin Radford (1975) , who endorses this proposal, apparently thinks irrational reactions can be tolerated by the cognitivist as exceptions that prove the rule. Alex Neill (1993) argues that cognitivism does not require the belief that the fictional target of one's emotional response exists in the actual world. According to Neill, one can pity a fictional character provided one believes that the character exists in a pitiable situation in the world of the fiction. Another attractive Stephen Davies 5 3 For discussion, see Lamb 1987. 4 Walton's unfortunate terminology-he writes of the emotions as fictional and also refers to quasi-emotions, by which he means our awareness of the purely physiological components of the response-has misled at least one of his philosophical critics; see Carroll 1990, 73-6. suggestion (offered in Carroll 1990 , Feagin 1996 , Lamarque 1996 recommends modifying the cognitive theory to allow that the relevant cognitive role can be played sometimes by make-belief, not only by belief. The emotional evocativeness of fictions entertained as such then no longer calls the cognitive theory into doubt.
In Davies 1980 Davies (also in 1983 Davies , 1994a Davies , 2001 For discussion of the use of music in marketing, see Milliman 1982 , Bruner 1990 , and North & Hargreaves 1997 . Shatin (1970 discusses the use of music to control and change the listener's mood; see also Bunt & Pavlicevic (2001) and the practical guide to music selections associated with desired emotional responses edited by Capurso et al. (1952) .
In other words, the music generates an objectless mood that reflects its own, calm expressive character.
The second kind of music-based emotional contagion is the one I described earlier. The music is the object of attention and is inevitably recognized as the source (or one of the sources) of the response it calls forth. The listener responds to the music, though the response is not about the music. The response is experienced as occasioned by and linked to the music, not as some undirected mood (Davies 1994a). 8 To say the response is attentional is, of course, not to maintain that the person subject to emotional contagion attends to or is even aware of the causal mechanisms responsible for the transmission of affect. Typically she is not. She attends to the source of contagion, the music's expressive character, without following the process by which this affect becomes one she shares.
In many cases, however, the attention she pays to expressions of the source emotion plays a crucial role in opening her up to the relevant triggers of emotional communication.
Film music may turn out sometimes to involve the one kind of contagion, at others the other, or to involve the one kind more often with one group of viewers than with the rest. Many moviegoers are not aware of the film's accompanying music as they hear it, while
Stephen Davies 8 8 Maddell (2002) objects to accounts of music's expressiveness like mine (Davies 1980 (Davies , 1994a ) and Kivy's (1989) that they leave the listener's response only loosely tied to the music. He cites Radford (1991) , and the objection does seem relevant to Radford's view, in which music is a cause of objectless moods that are about "everything and nothing." The objection does not have much force against the position I defend, however, which stresses the attentional dependence of the response on the music's expressive development.
others are aware of but not focused on the music, yet both kinds of viewers are liable to be emotionally primed by the music they hear.
At other times, the music draws attention to itself and clearly establishes an emotional tone for (or tension against) the movie action that is to follow. If there is emotional contagion in either case, it is non-attentional in the first and attentional in the second.
As well, some members of the audience may be inclined to listen more often and more carefully to the movie's music, in which case if they are infected by the music they are likely to be conscious more finally, our recognizing that we share some reaction modifies that reaction, for instance, by augmenting it-people laugh thirty times more often when they are with strangers who also display their amusement than when they are alone (Provine 1996) Kivy (1987 Kivy ( , 1989 persona. 11 Or finally, instead of proposing a rival account, one can file it in the "too hard" basket: "And only music, with its capacity not only to go beyond words but to exist only beyond words, can provide an explanation of why we respond the way we do to it. We are confusing the issue further by attempting to package this emotive understanding in terms of language, or in terms of objects and beliefs. Perhaps this is where both music as well as emotion should, as Wittgenstein suggests, be passed over in silence" (Worth 2000:106) .
I find all these alternatives unconvincing and have argued against most of them elsewhere (Davies 1994a (Davies , 1994b (Davies , 1997 (Davies , 2006 emotions" (Hatfield et al. 1994:148) . Hatfield et al. (1994: 148-52) provide compelling evidence for the truth of this hypothesis. And common sense and experience suggest that one is more likely to catch another's mood by attending to his emotions and signals of affect than by ignoring them. Filmmakers are aware of this and focus spectators' attention on characters' facial features in order to elicit emotional contagion or empathy (Plantinga 1999 , Coplan 2006 ).
In fact, Robinson regularly cites psychologists' experiments in which the subjects were asked to listen to-that is, attend to- 
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Stephen Davies 14 12 Robinson is correct that I regard music as expressive by virtue of its presenting appearances of emotion. I do allow that real emotions of the composer can be expressed in his or her work, but I also hold this to be a sophisticated act of expression achieved via the composer's appropriation of the expressive character of the music he or she writes (see Davies 1986 Davies , 1994a thing. There are good biological reasons for this fact. Our first reaction as social creatures that rely on our mind-reading abilities is to respond to the outward show as a window on the human soul.
That is how (and why) we react to expressiveness in music: it is no less a human form of expression, though it is a far more sophisticated one, than weeping is.
Few deny that music often powerfully calls from them an emotional echo of its own expressiveness. I think we respond directly to that expressiveness-and not that we respond to a persona we imagine to inhabit the music, for example-so I do not find it at all implausible to regard that response as suggesting we find music evocative of contagious responses. Because there is money to be made, marketers and the psychologists they employ have taken the trouble to establish that music can affect us subliminally through contagion. Why think it would not do so more directly when we focus on its expressive power?
Why do people choose basset hounds as pets? No doubt there can be many reasons, but I guess that many a basset pup has elicited a sympathetic "oooh, poor baby" from its owner-to-be. Why do basset hounds not drive their owners to suicide via contagion?
We can soon become inured to the surface mood of our environment. When we know that basset hounds are as fun loving as other breeds through living with them on a daily basis, the subliminal tendency we have to be affected negatively by the humanly sad-looking character of their faces is easily held in abeyance. If your partner had the misfortune to suffer a stroke that left him or her with a permanently down-turned mouth, you would
Stephen Davies 16 probably learn not to let this outward appearance of sadness affect you. So it is, I assume, for the owners of basset hounds. Robinson's jazzercise effect, which illustrates her model of emotional contagion, works like this: music arouses physiological changes; the subject aware of these changes looks for and latches on to cues in the environment and responds emotionally to them.
Robinson's model here is a notorious experiment performed by Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer (1962).
14 The experimenters used a drug to induce arousal in their subjects. These subjects, who were unaware of how or why their bodies were stimulated, matched their emotions to a stooge who behaved angrily with his situation in Stephen Davies 17 13 Peter Kivy, in a commentary on a draft of this paper, has described this concession as "utterly devastating" for my view, because we have resided with sad music our entire lives and therefore should never respond to it via contagion. I do not agree. My claim is that there is a disposition toward contagious responses that is realized in some cases. One way it can be dulled or deadened is by over-exposure to a given piece. As for the ubiquity of sad music, it is important to recall that we react to the expressive detail of particular works (Davies 1999) , so it is not surprising if our emotions are gripped when we return to those works, despite having been exposed to other, similarly expressive pieces in the meantime. is not to me from the music, but to me from people in my environment. In all these cases, the music is relevant because it heightens my physiological condition and in that way disposes me more than might otherwise be the case to adopt an affective stance, so that I come to experience a mood or to resonate emotionally with some aspect of my environment. But the music is always Stephen Davies 18 remote from the response. It plays a role in making me receptive to emotional experience, but this role might have been played instead by three cups of espresso or a shot of adrenaline. Certainly, the response is not made to the music.
I do not deny that people sometimes react affectively in the way just described or that music sometimes initiates the process by which this occurs. I agree, that is, that music can affect the listener's physiological state in ways of which she is not directly aware, and that this can lead her to interrogate her wider environment for cues as to the character of her affective state. For the examples previously described, however, I deny that the response involves catching the music's expressive character. If contagion occurs, it does not directly involve the music. So, when developed this way, Robinson's would not be an account of musical contagion.
How could the music play a more prominent role? Schachter's experiment has been taken as an instance of emotional contagion (as in Hatfield et al. 1994:111-13 ) because the subjects tended to catch the confederate's emotion. If the music not only initiated the change in the listener but also participated in her reaction, much as the confederate did in the experiment, the result would involve musical contagion, the transmission of affect from the music to the listener. Moreover, the suggestion is plausible. It would not be surprising if the listener latched on to the music, to which she is attending already, and in particular, to the emotional character of the sounds it presents. Her attention to the music then closes a causal circle: the music affects her physiology, which makes her attend more closely to what it expresses and disposes her to account for her own reaction in similar terms. This description is consistent with a very familiar case-we are physiologically affected
Stephen Daviesby events in our neighborhood, which makes them perceptually and cognitively salient, which leads to our taking them as the intentional objects of our emotion-except that, for music, where we are aware that its sadness, say, is not an appropriate object for our sympathy, it is the echoing response, not sympathy, that is elicited.
Is this how Robinson's account should be understood? As I say, this story is one of emotional contagion via music and is plausible. affects-fear, anger, happiness, sadness, surprise, and disgust-that have universally recognizable facial displays and that are modular in the sense that they are triggered and operate independently of conscious reflection (Ekman 1972 (Ekman , 1980 (Ekman , 1992 . 16 These are called "affect programs", though it is not uncommon for psychologists to proceed as if this technical term designates all that is covered by the word "emotion" in its ordinary, day-to-day use.
As well, psychologists and others have long been interested in empathy, sympathy, mob psychology, social conformity, and emotional communication, but emotional contagion was not usually distinguished from other versions of these modes of emotional engagement. 17 It was in the 1990s that the topic of emotional contagion attracted the attention of psychologists in its own right. A key work, mentioned earlier, is by Hatfield et al. (1994) . 18 Their
Stephen Davies 21 16 Note that non-cognitive reactions of these kinds were discussed above as possible counterexamples to the cognitive theory of the emotions. hypothesis (1994:53-63 And because they naturally focus on the human-to-human case, the relevant causes are identified with neurological, physiological, or behavioral patterns that are distinctively human (or animal).
There is a lesson philosophers have learned from functionalist theories of the mind. A given state or process might be realized in Stephen Davies 24 21 The experiments cited by Brennan concern the regulation of human ovulation and show how exposure both to men's and women's perspiration affect the cycle. As well, there is interesting work she does not cite indicating that females detect male MHC (major histocompatibility complex) alleles (and vice versa). A male with MHC alleles differing from a given female's alleles thereby signals his capacity to father children with stronger immune systems.
Women prefer such men at the peak of monthly fertility, but otherwise take as partners men with MHC alleles nearer their own. For discussion, see Milinski (2003) and Thornhill & Gangestad (2003 What are these causal routes in the musical case? That would be for scientists to discover, but it is possible to offer some speculative suggestions. I favor the view that music is expressive because we experience it as presenting the kind of carriage, gait, or demeanor that can be symptomatic of states such as happiness, sadness, anger, sassy sexuality, and so on. Stephen Davies 27
